

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
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AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY RABAT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 12361

USEEC

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: EAID, XA, EEC
SUBJECT: EC COMMISSIONER CHEYSSON COMMENTS ON SITUATION
-- IN ZAIRE AND THE MERITS OF A PAN-AFRICAN
-- PEACE-KEEPING FORCE

REF: BRUSSELS 11164

1. SUMMARY: DURING A JUNE 20 CONVERSATION BETWEEN CHARGE
AND EC COMMISSIONER FOR DEVELOPMENT CLAUDE CHEYSSON ON
AFRICA AND OTHER MATTERS, CHEYSSON ELABORATED ON HIS
EARLIER PUBLIC STATEMENTS (REFTEL) CONCERNING ZAIRE. IN
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, HE ALSO GAVE HIS VIEWS ON THE
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RELATIVE MERITS OF A PAN-AFRICAN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.
CHEYSSON CONSIDERS MOBUTU THE MAIN PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO
CREATING AN ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY VIABLE ZAIRE, BUT
HE IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE INCOM-
PETENCE IN GOZ. CHEYSSON BELIEVES THAT PAN-AFRICAN
MILITARY FORCE IS UNLIKELY TO BE A USEFUL INSTRUMENT IN
SOLVING AFRICA'S PROBLEMS, AND THINKS THAT IF ONE IS

NONETHELESS CREATED, IT SHOULD BE UNDER OAU AUSPICES AND WITH BROADEST POSSIBLE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN MODERATES. END SUMMARY.

2. ON ZAIRE, AFTER REITERATING HIS CONCERN THAT OUTSIDE INTERVENTIONS WHICH ARE PUBLICALLY PRESENTED OR DEFENDED AS DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO PROTECT WHITES (SUCH AS THE ONE IN KOLWEZI) RUN THE RISK OF WESTERN IDENTIFICATION WITH THE VORSTER REGIME, CHEYSSON DESCRIBED THE EC'S RELATIONS WITH MOBUTU AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT MOBUTU IS "CLEVER" IN MANY WAYS, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS DIVIDE AND RULE POLICY, CHEYSSON NONETHELESS BELIEVES MOBUTU REPRESENTS THE MAIN PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO ZAIRE'S FUTURE. IN THE TEN TO TWELVE TIMES CHEYSSON HAS TALKED WITH MOBUTU IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS, NOT ONCE HAS THE LATTER FOLLOWED THROUGH ON CHEYSSON'S FRIENDLY ADVICE ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES. IN RECENT WEEKS IT HAS BECOME APPARENT, IN CHEYSSON'S OPINION, THAT THE LEADERSHIP SITUATION IN ZAIRE IS AT A LOW EBB, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE DEARTH OF GOOD SENIOR OFFICERS IN THE ARMY.

3. CONCERNING ECONOMIC MATTERS, INCLUDING THE JUNE 13-14 MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON THE SHORT- AND LONGER-TERM FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC NEEDS OF THE GOZ, CHEYSSON OBSERVED THAT, BECAUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INCOMPETENCE IN THE GOZ, ONLY 30 PERCENT OF THE MONIES EARMARKED FOR ZAIRE UNDER THE CONFIDENTIAL

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EC'S FOURTH EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (EDF) HAVE THUS FAR BEEN COMMITTED. FURTHERMORE, IF ONE CONSIDERS PROJECT AID UNDER THE EC CONTRIBUTION TO THE CIEC SPECIAL ACTION FUND AND OTHER MONIES AVAILABLE UNDER THE LOME CONVENTION, THE GOZ HAS ABOUT 100 MILLION UNITS OF ACCOUNT IN COMMUNITY FUNDS AVAILABLE TO IT--BUT SIMPLY DOESN'T KNOW HOW TO USE THEM PRODUCTIVELY. IN SUPPORT OF HIS CONTENTION THAT THE GOZ HAS A LONG HISTORY OF INEPTITUDE AND MISMANAGEMENT IN THIS AREA, CHEYSSON REFERRED TO 15 MILLION UNITS OF ACCOUNT OF EC EMERGENCY AID DONATED TO ZAIRE IN 1974 THAT, TWO AND A HALF YEARS LATER, HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETELY SPENT.

4. IN A SIMILAR VEIN, THE COMMISSIONER COMMENTED ON MOBUTU AIDE BISENGEMANA'S ASTONISHMENT ON LEARNING JUST BEFORE THE JUNE 13-14 SESSION IN BRUSSELS ON THE MOBUTU PLAN THAT HE WOULD NOT HEAD THE GOZ DELEGATION TO THE MEETING. BISENGEMANA TRIED TO TELEPHONE MOBUTU FROM BRUSSELS BUT THE LATTER "COULD NOT BE REACHED". CONSEQUENTLY, THE GOZ DELEGATION AT THE MEETING WAS INFERIOR IN CALIBER, ACCORDING TO CHEYSSON. MOREOVER, THE EC COMMISSION'S JUNE 15-16 FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ZAIRE DELEGATION REGARDING EC SHORT-TERM ASSISTANCE PRODUCED NOTHING OF VALUE, AND NO

ONE KNOWS AT THIS STAGE HOW MONIES EARMARKED FOR ZAIRE
UNDER THE LOME CONVENTION INDICATIVE AID PROGRAM WILL
ULTIMATELY BE APPORTIONED.

5. AT THIS POINT THE CONVERSATION TURNED TOWARD BROADER
AFRICAN SECURITY INTERESTS, WITH CHEYSSON EXPRESSING HIS
FEAR THAT THE PRC'S RECENT OFFER OF ASSISTANCE TO THE GOZ
MAY HAVE GONE TO MOBUTU'S HEAD. SUCH AID, ACCORDING TO
CHEYSSON, WOULD NOT HELP RESOLVE ZAIRE'S DIFFICULTIES; ON
THE CONTRARY, IT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO A NEW FLOW OF
ASSISTANCE TO THE FNLA, LEADING TO FURTHER GOZ PROBLEMS
WITH ANGOLA. THE COMMISSIONER THEN OFFERED HIS PERSONAL
OPINION--"NOT BASED ON ANY HARD INFORMATION"--THAT ANGOLA
DID NOT TRIGGER THE SHABA II AFFAIR, EVEN THOUGH NETO AND
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HIS SUPPORTERS MUST BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRAINING AND

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EQUIPPING THE REBEL UNITS. NONETHELESS, THE BOTTOM LINE, IN CHEYSSON'S VIEW, IS THAT "MOST" OF THE POPULATION IN SHABA IMMEDIATELY SIDED WITH THE REBELS DURING THE RECENT INVASION, AND UNREST WILL NO DOUBT PERSIST BECAUSE "MISERY HAS PASSED ITS LIMITS" IN ZAIRE.

6. CHEYSSON THEN OFFERED HIS VIEWS, IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUESTIONS, ON POSSIBLE WESTERN STRATEGIES FOR COPING WITH AFRICAN POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS. CHEYSSON ESSENTIALLY SEES THE FOLLOWING VIABLE APPROACHES: (A) DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE -- THIS SHOULD CONTINUE, IN CHEYSSON'S OPINION, NO MATTER WHAT THE POLITICAL MAKEUP OF THE RECIPIENT GOVERNMENTS; (B) THERE SHOULD BE OUTSIDE
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"INVOLVEMENT" (BY FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES) ONLY IN CASE OF "GENUINE" EMERGENCIES. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THE NEXT SUCH EVENT COULD BE A NON-SECURITY SITUATION, E.G., A FLOOD OR OTHER NATURAL DISASTER FOR WHICH THE AFFECTED COUNTRY REQUESTS OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE; (C) PAN-AFRICAN FORCE -- SPEAKING PERSONALLY, RATHER THAN AS AN EC COMMISSIONER, CHEYSSON DOUBTED THAT A SECURITY FORCE IS NEEDED OR WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS IN MOST AFRICAN REGIONS. HE THOUGHT THAT IF, HOWEVER, THE OAU SHOULD NONETHELESS DECIDE TO ESTABLISH A "CRISIS COMMITTEE", IT WOULD BE INDISPENSABLE THAT NIGERIA, GHANA, AND KENYA JOIN MOROCCO, SENEGAL, AND THE OTHER MODERATES IN ANY "EMERGENCY FORCE" THE OAU MIGHT SANCTION. CHEYSSON IS "DEAD AGAINST" THE APPROACH ADVOCATED BY GISCARD. SINCE, IN CHEYSSON'S VIEW, SUCH A FORCE WOULD BE USELESS, AND POTENTIALLY EVEN DANGEROUS, HE IS GRATIFIED THAT RECENTLY GISCARD HAS SEEMED TO BE BACKING AWAY FROM HIS INITIAL PROPOSAL, PROBABLY AS A RESULT OF CRITICISM BY CERTAIN AFRICAN LEADERS AT THE FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT IN PARIS. FINALLY, CHEYSSON NOTED THE "UNFORTUNATE" TENDENCY IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO CONFUSE OR COMBINE THE ACTIONS WHICH HE CATEGORIZED UNDER POINTS B AND C ABOVE. MORRIS

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